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ABSTRACT
This paper performs a longitudinal comparison of public and
private sector pay. Although not decisive because of small sample
sizes, the results tend to corroborate the conclusions of previous
cross-sectional studies, Specifically, I find that on average
wages of federal workers exceed those of private sector workers by
10% to 25%, while wages of state and local government workers are
roughly equivalent to or slightly less than the wages of private
sector workers, Furthermore, these conclusions hold for a sample
of workers who joined the government after being involuntarily
displaced from their private sector jobs. In addition, a
comparative analysis of the length of job queues suggests that on
average more workers apply for job openings in the federal
government than in the private sector,
Finally, both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses support
the conclusion that the union wage gap is substantially smaller in
the public sector than in the private sector.
Alan B. Krueger
Dept. of Economics and
Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544Several academic researchers have addressed the issue of
whether federal government workers are paid more than comparable
private sector workers. In general, these studies use
cross-sectional data to estimate the differential in wages
between federal and private sector workers, controlling for
observed worker characteristics such as age and education
(examples are Smith 1976, 1977 and Quinn 1979). This literature
typically finds that wages are 10% to 20% greater for federal
workers than private sector workers, all else constant. In
conflict with the findings of academic studies, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics' official wage comparability survey consistently
finds that federal workers are paid less than private sector
workers who perform similar jobs.1 Moreover, the government's
findings have been confirmed by an independent study by Hay
Associates (1984) .Additionalresearch is needed to resolve this
conflict.
When the focus turns to state and local governments,
insignificant differences in pay are generally found between
state and local government employees and private sector
employees. One important difference, however, is the varying
effect of unions on compensation in the two sectors. An
overwhelming amount of evidence suggests that the union wage gap
is substantially smaller in the state and local government sector
than in the private sector.2
This chapter extends the literature on public sector/private
sector wage differentials by examining two new types of evidence,2
namely longitudinal data and job queues.3With longitudinal
data I examine the change in a worker's pay as he or she moves
from the private to the public sector, or vice versa. This
analysis has th advantage of reflecting the government's
relevant external labor market because it is based on the actual
transitions of workers, and of controlling for worker
characteristics that remain fixed as workers change jobs. The
data on job queues are used to compare the number of individuals
who apply for jobs in the federal government to the number who
apply for jobs In the private sector. If prospective employees
consider government employment (e.g. wage and nonwage benefits)
more attractive than private sector employment, we would expect
to find a longer queue of applicants for government jobs than
private sector jobs, all else constant.
The major result of the chapter is that longitudinal and
cross-sectional Lanalyses yield broadly similar estimates of the
differential in pay between public and private sector workers,
and similar estimates of the union-nonunion wage gap in the
public sector. Furthermore, the comparison of job application
rates suggests that for the average job opening the federal
government receives more applications than the average private
sector firm. Foi certain occupations such as engineers, however,
it appears that he government has a shortage of job applicants.
The findings are generally consistent with the previous academic
literature.
Finally, the chapter explores several possible rationales3
that might explain why the federal government appears to
consistently pay higher wages than the private sector for
comparable employees. The specific focus is on issues relating
to turnover, morale, motivation, supervision, employee transfers,
employer size, and unions.4
1. Pay Determination in the Federal Government
Federal employees are covered by &numberof different wage
schedules.4 However, the General Schedule (CS) for white collar
workers and the Federal Wage System (FWS) for blue collar workers
are the two major wage schedules for civilian federal employees.
Since federal employees are overwhelmingly white collar workers,
the General Schedule is the predominant wage schedule used by the
13.5. government --nearly1.5 million full-time federal employees
were covered by the General Schedule as of March 1985.
The General Schedule consists of 18 grades, 05-1 through
05-15, with 05-1 the lowest grade.5 A grade corresponds to a
salary range. Each work level of each occupation is assigned to
one of the grades. For example, nearly all nurses are classified
between 05-4 and 05-9. Within a grade, employees may advance
through ten salary steps, depending on length of service and
completion of sufficiently competent work. Some additional
flexibility is introduced into the system because agencies may
apply to the Office of Personnel Management's Special Rates and
Analysis Division for higher step classifications (up to the
tenth step of the grade) if they encounter difficulty recruiting
or retaining employees in certain occupations (e.g. engineering)
or regions (e.g. Los Angeles).
The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 is the statutory
basis of the General Schedule. The Act requires that federal
workers receive equivalent wages to private sector workers
performing the same level of work. To this end, each year in5
March the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) conducts a survey of
private sector wages of professional, administrative, technical
and clerical jobs (the PATC survey). Based on this survey, the
ELS recommends to Congress and the President salary increases for
each grade to take effect the following October. The President,
in turn, has the option to submit an alternate proposal for white
collar pay increases to Congress. Each year since 1976 the
President has elected this option and proposed wage increases
that were less than the amount called for by the PATC survey.
In the early 1970's the PATC comparability survey found that
wages were virtually equal between CS and private sectorworkers
in similar occupations, but by 1980 the CS fell behind the
private sector by 14%, and by 1986 the CS trailed the private
sector by 23.8%.
The PATC survey has been criticized on several grounds.
First, many jobs in the public sector are not directly comparable
to private sector jobs, and jobs that are equivalent may have
inaccurate job descriptions. Second, the PATC survey neglects
nonwage compensation. Finally, the survey has been unduly
criticized because it over-samples large establishments.In
1985, the minimum establishment size requirement for the PATC
survey ranged from 50 to 250 employees depending on the industry.
Although larger establishments appear to pay higher wages for
workers of equal quality (e.g. Brown and Medoff 1985), the
following calculation suggests that it is unlikely that the
sampling design of the PATC survey produces a sizable bias on the6
estimated pay differential. A wage regression with 1979 CPS data
shows that white collar employees in establishments with fewer
than 100 employees earn about 7% lower wages than employees in
larger establishments. Since less than half of private sector
employees work in establishments with fewer than 100 employees.
neglecting employees in small establishments will upwardly bias
the estimated wage of private sector workers by less than 3.5%.
It should be noted, however, that an independent study by
Hay Associates for the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service reached conclusions similar to the PATC survey. The Hay
Associates applied the same compensation analyses it uses to
evaluate the pay scales of major private sector employers: jobs
in both sectors were assigned points by managers according to
their degree of difficulty, and comparisons were made between the
CS and the wages of a sample of private sector employers who had
previously used Hay Associates' services. The study found that
CS pay was 10.3% less than the pay of private sector employees
performing similar jobs in 1984. Although the Hay Associates'
study can be easily criticized for its non-random sample of
private employers, the results are qualitatively similar to the
PATC survey.
2. Hethodolofy
Studies of public sector wages that estimate human capital
earnings functions with cross-sectional data can not control for
unobserved differences in worker productivity, such as innate7
ability and motivation. This can be seen in equation (1), where
wj is the hourly wage rate, is a vector of observed
productivity and demographic characteristics and $isa vector
of returns to these characteristics, is a dummy variable that
takes on the value 1 if the worker is employed in the public
sector and 0 if he or she is in the private sector, 6 is the
public sector wage differential. represents unobserved time
invariant worker characteristics, and is a white noise error
term.6 The subscript i refers to individuals and ttotime.
(1)ln(wit) —Xitfl
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If public sector workers are more productive than their
private sector counterpart in terms of unobserved characteristics
and if workers are positively rewarded for these unobserved
characteristics, the unobserved factors will "load-on" the public
sector dummy variable and thus upwardly bias the estimated public
sector wage differential.
Longitudinal data provide a means to control for time
invariant, unobserved variables. The approach taken here is to
estimate first difference (or fixed-effects) regressions to
control for unobserved variables.7 As can be seen in equation
(2), first differencing the data (denoted by )nets-outthe
constant unobserved factors that bias cross-sectional analyses.
However, controlling for fixed-effects is not without costs since
first differencing typically exacerbates measurement error bias8
and raises issues about the selectivity of job switchers. These
potential biases are considered in the empirical analysis.
(2) Aln(wi) —AX.fl
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Finally, it should be noted that equation (2) can be
generalized to allow different changes in employment to have
different effects on wages. Because of voluntary mobility of
many job changers the wage growth, V of workers who join the
government relative to those who remain in the private sector,
(Wpg -Wpp)may not equal the relative wage change of workers who
leave the government, (Wgp -Wgg)in absolute value. The
consequences of voluntary job changes for the longitudinal
analysis is discussed further in the empirical section below.
Data Sets
A longitudinal data set that follows individuals over time
is necessary to estimate equation (2). Two longitudinal data
sets are used. The first is a series of matched May Current
Population Surveys (CPS). The rotation group design of the CPS
allows for the creation of a large longitudinal data set because
half of the households surveyed in a given month are
re-interviewed the following year, and thus may be matched from
one year to the next.
This study uses matched May CPS data from 1980-1979,
1978-1977, and 1975-1974. Each individual is observed in two9
consecutive years. The data from all three matched data sets are
pooled together to create a large sample of public sector/private
sector switchers and year dummy variables are included in the
regressions to control for wage inflation. CPS reports that
about 70% of eligible observations are typically matched from one
year to the next. Even with this large data set there is only a
relatively small sample of workers who move between the public
and private sectors, and it is necessary to pooi together
observations on men and women to estimate the public sector wage
differential more precisely.
Since CPS can not match individuals who change their address
during the course of the year, the sample is not completely
representative of all workers. However, this sample selection
rule is not likely to produce an important bias in the estimated
wage differentials because both joiners and leavers who move to a
new location are eliminated from the sample.8 On the other hand,
this feature of the data has the virtue of assuring that wage
changes do not represent cost of living adjustments for workers
who move to relatively high wage areas (e.g. Washington, D.C.)
because all workers remain in the same area both time periods.
Following most previous studies, government employees are
identified from their reported industry status. (In recent years
CI'S identifies the level of government in the class of worker
variable.)Unfortunately, this procedure only identifies
government employees involved in public administration, which
consists of employees engaged in legislative, judicial,10
administrative and regulatory activities. At the federal level,
this includes workers employed by most agencies and bureaus, the
courts, and the secret service. The Army Corp of Engineers and
Government Printing Office are examples of exclusions from public
administration.At the state and local government level
policemen, firefighters and tax collectors are examples of
workers classified in public administration, while other
employees such as public school teachers and librarians are
classified in private sector industries. In total, 51% of
federal workers, 35% of state government workers, and 20% of
local government workers ate classified in public
9 administration.
The sample contains full and part-time civilian non-
agricultural employees 16 years old or older. The earnings
variable is usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours.
All individuals whose derived wage rate is less than $1.00 per
hour or more than $200.00 per hour are eliminated from the
sample.1° Furthermore, workers who are categorized as government
employees according to the class of worker variable but not
categorized in a public administration industry are eliminated
from the sample. Finally, workers who move from one branch of
government service to another (e.g. state government to local
government) are eliminated from the sample in order to compare
public sector workers to private sector workers.
DisDlaced Workers Survey
The second longitudinal data set is drawn from the CPS11
supplemental surveys of displaced workers. In January of 1984
and 1986 the Census Bureau asked a sequence of retrospective
questions to workers who lost a job in the preceding five years
because of a plant closing, permanent layoff or unforseen job
abolishment. Responses from both surveys are pooled together to
create a sample of more than 4,000 workers who were displaced
from private sector jobs. Almost 10% of these workers joined the
public sector.
This data set (hereafter referred to as the Displaced
Workers Survey) helps solve the problem of selective job changers
because only workers who were involuntarily displaced from their
jobs are in the sample. Since the notion of a job displacement
from the public sector is questionable, workers who are initially
in the public sector are eliminated from the sample. Furthermore,
construction workers are eliminated from the sample because of
the temporary, discontinuous nature of their work.
One disadvantage of the Displaced Workers Survey is that
hourly wage rates and weekly hours are not available. Instead,
the usual weekly wage is used as the dependent variable and the
sample is restricted to full-time (at least 35 hours per week)
workers. On the other hand, the data set has the advantages of
following workers who moved to a new location, contains tenure on
the initial job, and identifies government workers on the basis
of the class of worker variable rather than the industry
11 variable. And furthermore, the sample covers a recent time
period.12
3.E.Dirical Results
Longitudinal and cross-sectional estimates of the public
sector wage differential are considered below. The results for
federal, postal, state and local government employees are
considered in turn, with most attention devoted to the federal
sector.
The Federal Wa2e Differential
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, it is useful
to consider some summary statistics. Table 1 focuses on
differences between federal and private sector workers who move
between sectors or remain in the same sector using the matched
CPS data set, which includes voluntary and involuntary movers.
The table contains means of several variables for four subgroups
--joinersto the federal government (from the private sector),
stayers in the private sector, stayers in the federal government,
and leavers from the federal government (to the private sector).
Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 1.One striking
difference between switchers and stayers is that labor mobility
is disproportionately large between the federal sector and the
service industry. Fifty-five percent of workers who joined the
public sector left jobs in the service industry, while 38% of the
workers who left federal employment for private employment joined
the service industry. In comparison, only about 20% of private
sector workers are employed in the service sector at a point in











(From Federal) variable (ToFederal)
change Log Wage
Males .192 .093 .080 .083
Females .262 .106 .076 .226
Initial OccuDation
Professional .161 .103 .327 .143
Management .065 .097 .148 .238
Clerical .484 .185 .337 .286
Sales .032 .067 .000 .000
crafts .097 .170 .097 .143
Operatives .032 .212 .092 .095
Laborers .000 .049 .026 .048
Service Workers .129 .117 .047 .048
Industry
Construction .000 .058 NA .048
Manufacturing .129 .346 NA .048
Transportation .032 .082 NA .095
Wholesale &
Retail Trade .226 .240 NA .143
F.I.R.E. .065 .064 NA .238
Service .548 .193 NA .381
Mining .000 .016 NA .048

















32.7 38.5 41.9 37.7 Age
Education 12.5 11.9 13.6 12.9
Nonwhite .065 .091 .162 .190
Female .677 .397 .339 .286
Married .774 .836 .899 .714
Union Status




Period Two .097 .259 .203 .191
Note: Sample sizes for columns (1) (4) are 31, 18,348, 493 and
21, respectively. Data set is matched May CPS. 1974-1975,
1977-1978, and 1979-1980. NA means not applicable.13
It is also apparent from Table 1 that workers who join the
federal government are more likely to be in white collar jobs,
female, white, unmarried, nonunion, and younger than workers who
remain in the private sector, while workers who leave the federal
government are more likely to be male, nonwhite, unmarried,
nonunion, and slightly younger than those who remain in the
federal sector.
Table 2 presents regression estimates of the public sector
wage differential for each level of government, holding constant
the occupation, human capital and demographic controls listed at
the bottom of the table.12 Column (1) of the table reports
results of regressions on first differences (equation 2), and for
comparison column (2) reports cross-sectional results (equation
1). Each coefficient reported in the table is estimated from a
separate regression. A puzzling result is that the longitudinal
analysis finds a statistically insignificant 6% wage differential
for federal workers relative to private sector workers, while the
cross-sectional estimate with the same data set is nearly 25%
percent and highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the
cross-sectional finding is similar in magnitude to the results of
studies surveyed earlier.
Estimation of a more flexible specification that allows the
wage differential to vary for joiners and leavers helps resolve
this puzzle. The estimated wage change (standard error) of
workers who join the federal sector from the private sector as
opposed to remaining in the private sector (Wpg-Wpp) is .12Table 2: Public Sector/Private Sector Wage Differentkals









Federal and .058 .247
Private (.042) (.017)
[18,893]
Postal and .312 .113
Private (.088) (.024)
[18,603)
State and .051 .062
Private (.054) (.025)
[18.600)




a. Data set for fixed effects models is CPS matched May 1980-
1979. 1979-1978, and 1975-1974. Sample size is in brackets.
Cross-section is 1974, 1977 and 1979 CPS samples pooled together.
Results were qualitatively similar with the second period data
sample.
b. Controls column (1): change in occupation dummies (8), change
in education, change in union status, change in marital status,
age, and year dummies (2).
c.Controls column (2): occupation dummies (8), education, union
status, marital status, nonwhite, age group dummies (6), sex,
region dummies (3), and year dummies (2).14
(.05), while workers who move from the federal government tothe
private sector (Wgp-Wgg) experience a .05 (.07) wage gain over
those who remain federal employees.13 Unfortunately, these wage
differentials are not estimated very precisely because of the
limited number of transitions between the private sector and the
federal government in this data set.
Consideration of the selection forces that affect job
changers suggests that the relative wage gains for workers who
join the federal government are more representative of the "true"
difference in wages between the federal government and private
sector.14 If employees face a distribution of jobs with
different wages (i.e. due to job matches or imperfect
information), optimal search behavior would lead employees to
voluntarily change jobs only if the new job offered better wage
and nonwage benefits than the current job. In addition, the
large pension losses imposed on workers who leave the federal
government discourage federal workers from moving to the private
sector unless they receive large wage gains (Ippolito, 1987).
On the other hand, focusing on workers who join the federal
government obviates many of the selectivity problems. First, if
wages in the federal sector truly exceed private sector wagesin
comparable jobs, private sector workers would have an incentive
to queue for federal jobs. The "lucky" private sector workers
who were selected for federal jobs would reap large wage gains.
Furthermore, private sector workers are less constrained by
pension rules.15
Results of Displaced Workers Survey
The issue of selectivity of job changers is dealt with in
perhaps a more satisfactory manner in our analysis of displaced
workers. In the ideal longitudinal experiment, workers would be
randomly assigned to move between the government and the private
sector. The Displaced Workers Survey is a better approximation
of the ideal experimental design because only workers who were
involuntarily displaced from their original private sector jobs
15 are included in the sample.
Table 3 compares the wage growth of workers who joined the
government after being displaced from their initial jobs in the
private sector to the wage growth of workers who accepted private
sector jobs after being displaced from their initial private
sector jobs. The regressions control for the year the worker was
displaced and the survey year, as well as tenure on the initial
job, geographic mobility, and changes in eight major occupations.
For comparison, the second column of the table presents cross-
sectional regression estimates of the various public sector. wage
differentials using the 1984 May CPS.
The results indicate that earnings growth of displaced
private sector workers who join the federal government exceeds
the earnings growth of displaced workers who remain in the
private sector by a statistically significant 10.7%. This
estimate is similar in magnitude to the 12.6% federal earnings
differential obtained from the cross-sectional regression with
the May 1984 CPS. Because of changes in relative federal-privateTable 3








Federal and .107 .126
Private (.055) (.020)
Postal and .126 .065
Private (.097) (.038)
State and - .037 - .100
Private (.045) (.018)
Local and - .044 - .096
Private (.033) (.013)
Notes:
a. Data set for fixed effects models is the January 1984 and
January 1986 CPS supplemental displaced worker surveys. The
sample consists of 3,844 workers who remained in the private
sector, 59 who joined the federal government, 19 who joined the
postal service, 91 who joined state governments, and 174 who
joined local governments. Controls are change in major occupation
dummies (8), tenure on previous job, age, a dummy variable
indicating whether the worker moved to a new location, year of
displacement dummies (4), and a dummy variable indicating whether
the observation is taken from the 1984 or 1986 survey.
ContinuedTable 3 -- Continued
b. Cross-section estimates are based on the May 1984 CPS survey.
Dependent variable is log usual weekly hours and sample is
restricted to full time workers. Sample sizes for rows 1 through
3 are 9,740, 9,896, and 10,521 respectively. Controls are
occupation dummies (8), education, union status, marital status,
nonwhite, age group dummies (6), sex, central city dummy, and
region dummies (3)
c. Standard errors in parentheses.16
compensation over time, these results should not be compared
directly to Table 2.
The initial industry that workers are employed in does not
appear to have an important effect on these findings. When the
sample is divided into subsamples of manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing workers, the first difference estimate of the
federal wage premium (standard error) is .11 (.08) for
nonmanufacturing workers and .10 (.07) for manufacturing workers.
Measurement Error
Estimation using both longitudinal data sets finds that the
federal wage differential is smaller in the longitudinal analysis
than in the corresponding cross-sectional analysis. It is well
known that measurement error biases regression coefficients
downward in absolute value, and Freeman (1984) proves that under
plausible assumptions measurement error produces a greater bias
in longitudinal analyses than cross-sectional analyses. Since
Mellow and Sider (1983) report evidence that misclassification in
the reporting of industry status at a point in time is a
pervasive problem in CPS data, measurement error bias may be
responsible for the smaller estimate of the federal wage
differential in the longitudinal analysis.
What effect does measurement error have on the longitudinal
estimation? If half of the observed transitions between the
federal government and private sector in the matched CPS data set
are the result of random misclassification errors, the first
difference estimate would be biased downward by about 50%. This17
would be large enough to account for the entire difference
between the longitudinal and cross-sectional results in the
matched CPS data set.
There is likely to be a smaller bias from measurement error
in the Displaced Workers Surveys than in the matched CPS data set
for two reasons. First, there are relatively more true sectoral
transitions in this data set because all of the workers changed
jobs. As a result, the signal in the data increases relative to
the noise. And second, government workers are identified by the
class of worker variable instead of the industry variable, which
is likely to reduce measurement error.
Unfortunately, given the small sample of switchers in the
data sets, and the potentially large effect of measurement error
bias, it is difficult to precisely estimate the federal wage
differential from the longitudinal analyses. Nonetheless, it
appears that longitudinal estimates of the federal wage
differential in both data sets are less than the corresponding
cross-sectional estimates. The difference between the
longitudinal and cross-sectional estimates may stem from
measurement errors and/or unobserved worker-specific
characteristics. Since Freeman (1984) has shown that cross-
sectional and longitudinal estimates of wage differentials
probably bound the true wage differential, it would appear that
the federal wage premium was between 12% and 25% in the 1970's
and between 11% and 13% in the mid 1980's,18
Who Gains from Federal Employment?
Lastly, I examine how the federal wage premium varies across
different types of workers, different regions of the US and over
time. Table 4 examines these issues for separate samples of men
and women. The federal wage premium is estimated for various
groups of workers by interacting several independentvariables
with a dummy variable that equals one if the worker is employed
by the federal government. Cross-sectional data are analyzed
because there are too few job changers in the longitudinal data
set to make accurate comparisons, and because the previous
results suggest that unobserved heterogeneity may not be a
serious problem in cross-sectional studies of the federal wage
premium.
Consistent with the findings of previous researchers, the
results indicate that the federal wage premium is greater for
female workers (especially nonwhite female workers) than for male
workers. This may reflect less discrimination in the federal
government than in the private sector (Asher and Popkin 1984;
Freeman 1987), or alternatively that the compressed government
wage structure benefits female dominated occupations relative to
male dominated occupations.
Along occupational lines, white collar workers appear to
receive a larger wage premium from federal employment than blue
collar workers.In addition, older workers and workers in the
south appear to benefit more from federal employment than younger















White Collar .215 .317
(.024) (.026)
Blue Collar .184 .178
(.039) (.154)
Region






North Central .140 .199
(.053) (.072)
ContinuedTable 4 -- Continued





















Sample Size 11,410 7,483
Notes: Coefficients are estimated from cross-section regressions
interacting each variable with a dummy variable for federal
employment. Controls are year dummies, occupation dummies (8),
union status, marital status, age group dummies (6)education and
race. Data set is pooled CPS data from 1974, 1977, and1979.19
regional differences may result from inherent rigidities caused
by a national nominal wage scale.
Finally, an analysts of the federal wage premium over time
shows that the wage gap between male federal workers and private
sector workers fell quite dramatically in the latter part of the
1970's, although a trend for women is much less pronounced.
Freeman (1987) notes a similar decline in the relative pay of
federal workers in several data sets.
Postal Workers
Turning next to postal workers, the longitudinal and
cross-sectional analyses in Tables 2 and 3 both find that the
wage of postal workers exceeds the wage of private sector
workers, although the magnitude of the differential appears to
have diminished over time.Given the small sample of postal
workers, however, the estimated wage differentials are extremely
imprecise. Nonetheless, these results support Perloff and
Wachter's (1984) claim that postal workers are paid more than
comparable private sector workers.
State and Local Government Workers
The estimated wage differential between state and local
government employees and private sector employees is similar in
the longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses using both data
sets. Furthermore, a decline in the wage of state and local
workers relative to private sector workers is evident in the
Displaced Workers Survey which covers the years 1980 through 1986
and in the matched CPS data set which covers the years 197420
through 1980.
The first difference regression using the matched CPS data
reported in Table 2 indicates that state government employees
earn 51% higher wages than private sector workers, while the
cross-sectional regression finds a 6.2% wage advantage for state
government employees over private sector employees. The
longitudinal estimate however, is statistically insignificant.
Analysis of the second data set reported in Table 3 finds that
displaced private workers who take employment in state
governments experience 3.7% less earnings growth than displaced
workers who remain in the private sector. And a cross-sectional
regression using the May 1984 CI'S finds that earnings are 10%
less among state government employees than private sector
employees
Lastly, on the local government level the firstdifference
regression using the matched CPS data finds a statistically
insignificant -3.8% public sector wage differential, while the
cross-sectional regression shows a statistically significant
positive 4.2% public sector wage differential. The Displaced
Workers Survey, on the other hand, shows a -4.4% earnings
differential for workers who join local governments, and the
cross-sectional regression with the May 1984 CPS shows a
statistically significant -9.6% earnings differential for local
government employees.
As noted earlier for the case of federal workers, reporting
errors in the state and local government variable would biasthe21
public sector wage differentials toward zero.
4.Oueues for Federal Jobs
Long (1982) ,Utgoff(1983) and others turn to evidence on
the quit rate in the federal government and the private sector to
infer conclusions about pay comparability. Since the quit rate
is substantially lower among federal workers, this is often cited
as support of the view that federal workers receive economic
rents.Ippolito (1987), however, challenges this interpretation.
He argues that the abnormally low quit rate in the federal sector
is due to the substantial pension losses imposed on workers who
quit the government early because federal pension benefits are
based on nominal wages at the time of departure, and because
pension benefits make-up a larger share of compensation in the
public sector than private sector.
An alternative form of evidence -- theapplication rate for
federal government and private sector jobs --isexamined here.16
In a textbook competitive labor market, firms pay a wage that is
just high enough to attract, motivate and retain a sufficient
number of qualified workers. Consequently, the number of workers
who queue for a job opening at a particular firm reflects the
relative attractiveness of working for that firm. A longer job
queue signals that workers perceive the firm to offer relatively
high pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits. It should be noted
that an comparison of job application rates overcomes a major
limitation of the quit rate studies because workers who are22
applying for a job consider the expected discounted valueof
future earnings, and are not seriously influenced by the "lock-
in" effects of pensions.
In addition to the overall attractiveness of the job, the
direct and indirect costs of the application process will affect
the number of applicants for a given job opening. More costly
and difficult application procedures will discourage applicants.
Included in the application cost are the psychic and time costs
ofobtaining information about job openings, filling-out an
application, being interviewed, and possibly taking an exam.If
the cost of applying for a job does not differ substantially
between two employers that draw from the same labor market, it is
reasonable to expect that the employer with the longer job queue
offers relatively more desirable employment.
There are three major limitations to judging federal pay
comparability by comparing the length of queues for federaland
private sector jobs. First, the cost of applying forfederal
jobs and private sector jobs is not equal. For instance,the
federal government requires a competitive entrance exam of many
job applicants, while this procedure may be less common in
private sector firms. In addition, the cost and processof
obtaining information about federal jobs differs from private
sector jobs. To the extent that it is more (less) costly to
apply for federal jobs than private sector jobs, therewill be
relatively fewer (more) applicants for available jobs in the
federal sector at a given level of wages and working conditions.23
The second limitation is that analyzing raw data on the
number of applicants per selection does not control for the
quality of the applicant pool.17 Krueger (1987) finds evidence
that an increase in the wage of federal workers relative to
private sector workers increases both the number and average
quality of applicants for federal jobs. The third limitation is
that the number of actual applicants is an imperfect measure of
the number of workers who would be willing to work for a given
firm.
Controlling for the different application costs and quality
of applicants in the federal and private sectors is beyond the
scope of available data, but a comparison between the number of
applicants for federal and private jobs provides a crude
indication of wage comparability. Table 5 presents data on the
length of the queue for federal jobs, measured by the number of
outside job applicants per new worker hired. Column (1) contains
the number of applicants from outside thegovernment (excluding
the postal service), and column (2) contains the number of
workers hired from these applicants during fiscalyear 1982.18
The third column contains the ratio of applicants tonew hires.
The data are broken down for severaloccupations.
The length of the queue for federal jobs variesconsiderably
across occupations, ranging from a high of 32.1 applicantsper
new hire for accountants and auditors to a low of 4.5 applicants
per new hire for engineers. The varying length of occupational











Blue Collar 127783 12,673 10.1
Steno/Typist 162,164 20,720 7.8
Life Science 5,370 140 38.4
Engineers 19,025 4,273 4.5
Mathematician 4,803 634 7.6
Physical Science13,356 1,057 12.6
Computer Spec. 8,958 864 10.4




AllJobs 1,132,260 107,967 10.5
Source: Unpublished data provided by the Office of Personnel
Management. Total for all jobs does not equal the sumof
occupations because of unclassified occupations and because
delegations to agencies are not recorded by occupation.24
skills (e.g. engineers) as well as the varying federal wage
premium among occupations. On average, 10.5 candidates applied
per new hire in the federal government in 1982.
How does this compare with the typical job application rate
in the private sector? Unfortunately, only scant data on
applications for private sector jobs are available. The most
suitable data set for our purposes is the Employment
Opportunities Pilot Project (EOfl) survey conducted by Gallup in
1982. The EOPP survey contains establishment-level information
on three relevant items:I) The number of applicants who applied
for the last position filled;2) The number of applications
received and job offers made in the preceding ten days; and 3)
the average number of job offers made per worker hired. Although
these questions are not identical to the application data
collected for federal government jobs, they provide a rough
indication of the number of applicants for private sector jobs.
According to tabulations using the EOPP data set, on average
private sector establishments receive 8.37 applications for the
most recently filled position, and 7.60 applications for each job
accepted job offer}9 Unfortunately, these data are not
available by occupation.
Although there are severe data limitations, a comparison of
the length of private sector and federal sector jobqueues is
suggestive. On average, openings for federal government jobs
appear to attract more applicants than openings for private
sector jobs. Depending on the survey question used, the results25
indicate that on average there is a 25% to 38% higher application
rate in the federal government than in the private sector. These
findings suggest that the positive federal wage differential is
not a compensating differential for undesirable work in the
federal government.
However, extreme caution should be taken in interpreting
these findings given the differences in the occupational
composition of the workforces in the federal government and
private sector, and the paucity of private sector data.
5.Why Does the Federal Government Pay High WaEes?
A variety of evidence suggests that the federal government
pays at least some workers more than their alternative wage. Why
does such a policy exist? Are there any possible benefits of
this policy that might offset the cost of higher wages? Can the
government wage structure be re-organized in a more efficient
way?
Undoubtedly, political constraints and motivations have an
important influence on public sector wages.(See Fogel and Lewin
1974 and Sorjas 1980 for evidence on the political aspects of
wage setting in the public sector.) My purpose here is not to
examine the political forces that affect the determination of
public sector wages, but instead to consider the possible
benefits to the government of pursuing a "high wage" policy, and
to suggest alternative less costly means to achieve some of these
benefits.26
The so called efficiency wage theories of the labor market
surveyed in Stiglitz (1986) emphasize the potential benefits to
employers of paying workers a greater wage than their alternative
wage. According to these theories, possible benefits to the firm
that result from paying relatively high wages can at least
partially offset the cost of paying above market-clearing wages.
These benefits include reduced turnover, reduced absenteeism,
improved morale, less worker malfeasance, lower supervision
costs, and improved employee selection.20
Evidence suggests that the federal government does reap at
least some return from its compensation policy. For instance,
Long (1982), Utgoff (1983) and others find that the turnover rate
of federal workers is unusually low. And Krueger (1987)
demonstrates that an increase in the wage of federal workers
relative to private sector workers increases both the number and
average quality of applicants for federal jobs. The quantitative
economic importance of these benefits, however, is uncertain.
Another element of the government wage structure that is
relevant to this discussion is that white collar federal workers
have a uniform nationwide wage schedule. Asecretary in New York
City earns the same wage as a secretary in Omaha, Nebraska, even
though the cost of living and labor market conditions differ
considerably between the two regions. Proponents of this system
justify nominal regional wage rigidity on the basis of
efficiency; they allege that employee morale would be damaged if
workers are forced to take a cut in nominalpay when they are27
transferred from one area of the country to another.
It is instructive that many large private sector firms, such
as IBM, resolve this problem by maintaining a uniform real wage
schedule across different regions of the country. Regional cost
of living adjustments are provided to workers who transfer from
one region of the country to another. Introducing regional wage
flexibility to the government wage structure (at least for jobs
with low transfer rates) will improve the efficiency of providing
government compensation. Additionally, this policy would improve
equity in the sense that all federal workers regardless of their
region of employment would receive the same real wage
compensation.
Finally, it should be noted that some large private sector
firms pay wages that are at least as high as the federal
government and that wages appear to rise with employer size (see
Brown and Medoff 1985). The federal government, it should be
remembered, is the single largest employer in the U.S. Although
the reasons for the employer size-wage effect are far from clear,
the federal wage premium may be closely related to the size of
the government.
6.The Union Ware Gao in th-e Public and Private Sectors
Since unions in the federal sector are usually prohibited
from bargaining over wages, the analysis of the effect of public
sector unions focuses on state and local government employees.
Nonetheless, it is reassuring to note that we do not find28
evidence of a differential in pay between union and nonunion
federal workers.
Most studies of union wage differences at the state and
local government level analyze cross-sectional data, and the unit
of observation is typically the bargaining unit or
municipality.21 By analyzing a longitudinal sample of individual
workers it is possible to control for unchanging, unobserved
worker characteristics. Furthermore, first difference estimation
controls for the possible endogeneity of unionization since the
effect of time-invariant unobserved variables that might be
correlated with public sector union membership andwages net-out.
Table 6 presents longitudinal and cross-sectional estimates
of the public sector union wage differential. The samples are
limited to workers who remain in the same sector eachyear, and
are drawn from the matched CPS data set since initial union
status is not available in the Displaced Workers Survey.
The major finding is that union membership does not havea
statistically or economically significant effect on the wages of
state and local government employees in either the longitudinal
or the cross-sectional estimation. Although the union variable
is likely to be fraught with reporting errors because workers
remained in the public sector (and probably thesame job) each
period, the magnitude of the union wage gaps in the longitudinal
estimation are so small that it is unlikely that measurement
error is responsible for these results. Furthermore, the growth
in public sector union membershipduring this period creates trueTable 6: Union/Nonunion Wage Differentials by Sector




Sample Fixed-Effects Cross -Section
Private Sector .087 .204
[22,042) (.009) (.007)
State Government .002 - .010
[220) (.044) (.058)
Local Government .002 .055
(502] (.038) (.039)
Notes:
a. Reported wage differentials are coefficients of the union
membership dummy variable in a log wage regression. Each sample
contains workers who remained in the same sector both periods.
b. Controls are the same as in Table 2, except industry dummies
were included in the regressions for private sector employees.
c.See Table 2 for other notes.29
transitions between union and nonunion status even for workers
who remain on the same job.
It should be stressed that our inability to find a
statistically significant difference in pay between union members
and non-members in the public sector does not necessarily imply
that unions have no effect on public sector compensation.It is
possible that unions raise wages for all public sector workers
(i.e. through lobbying) and not just union members. Furthermore,
unions may have a substantial effect on fringe benefits and
working conditions (Mitchell 1979).
In contrast to the insignificant union wage effect in the
public sector, the union wage effect in the private sector is
substantial during the same time period. The longitudinal
estimate of the union wage differential is about 9% and the
cross-sectional estimate is about 20%. When separate wage
changes are estimated for workers who join unions and leave
unions, the change in wages from going nonunion to union (NIJ) as
opposed to remaining union is 8.4%, while the change in wages
form going union to nonunion as opposed to remaining a union
member is -7.9%. These results are typical of this type of
research (see Freeman and t4edoff 1983 and Lewis 1986b for
surveys).
It is interesting to compare the estimates of the private
sector union wage differential to the federalwage differential.
The estimated federal wage differential and the private sector
union wage gap are about equal in magnitude. In addition,30
evidence suggests that a greater share of total compensation is
composed of fringe benefits in both the federal government and
the union private sector than in the nonunion private sector (see
Mitchell 1979). A high proportion of federal workers are
unionized (Burton 1979). Although federal unions are generally
precluded from bargaining over compensation, the wage gap between
federal workers and private sector workers, and the composition
of compensation in the federal sector closely parallel the
unionized private sector. These findings are consistent with
Levitan and Nodens (1983) view that unions legislatively
influence the determination of compensation in the federal
sector.31
6.Conclusion
This chapter asks whether public sector workers are paid
more than their alternative wage. Although the longitudinal
analysis and evidence from job queues are by no means definitive,
the results suggest that the average federal worker received a
higher wage than his or her alternative private sector wage in
the late 1970's and mid l980's. The major results are summarized
below.
The average worker who joins the federal government appears
to experience greater wage gains than the average worker who
remains in the private sector, while at the same time workers who
leave the federal government do not have a statistically
significant change in their wages. These results appear to hold
for men and women, and for a sample of displaced private sector
workers who join the federal government. However, in two data
sets the cross-sectional estimate of the federal wage
differential exceeds the longitudinal estimate. A large share of
the difference between the longitudinal and cross-sectional
estimates is probably due to measurementerrors, although it is
possible that unobserved worker-specific quality differentials
account for much of the difference.
In addition, evidence on the length of jobqueues as
measured by the number of outside job applicantsper new hire was
considered. The analysis suggests that for theaverage job
opening the federal government receives more outside applicants
than the average private sector firm, whichsupports a conclusion32
that the positive federal wage differential is not a compensating
differential for disagreeable work.
Why does the federal government pay higher wages on average
than the private sector? The chapter conjectures that the answer
to this question lies in the political nature of public sector
wage determination, the size of the government, possible
efficiency benefits of high wages, and the rigid federal wage
schedule.
At the state and local government level, both the
longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses suggest that the
differential in earnings between public and private sector
workers was small and positive in the 1970's, but became negative
by the mid 1980's. Furthermore, the empirical analysis finds no
evidence of a difference in pay between union and nonunion
members in the public sector.33
NOTES
1.Results of the government survey are reported annually in the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics National Survey of Professional.
Administrative. Technical and Clerical Pay.
2.See Lewis (1986a) for a thorough review of studies of the
effects of unions in the public sector.
3.I note that Moore and Raisian (1986) and Venti (1987) have
carried out longitudinal studies of public sector pay that are
similar in many respects to this one. The analysis presented
here differs from theirs primarily in that I separately examine
wage comparability for each level of government (i.e. federal,
postal, state and local) and analyze a sample of involuntarily
displaced" private sector workers.
4.See Smith (1976), Hartman (1983) and Ehrenberg and Schwarz
(1986) for an overview of wage determination in the public sector.
5.The General Schedule actually extends through CS-18, but
almost all of the positions above 65-15 have been reclassified
into the Senior Executive Service.
6.For simplicity, we abstract from differences inwages across
industries in the private sector and treat the entireprivate
sector as a homogeneous group. This procedure gives a weighted
average of the difference in wages between the government and
private industries.
7.This approach has been used to examine the unionwage effect
(Mellow 1979) ,compensatingwage differentials (Brown 1980). the
employer size wage effect (Brown and Medoff 1985) and inter-
industry wage differences (Krueger and Summers 1987).34
8. This will not produce a bias in the estimated wage effects
when the wage change for joiners is constrained to equal the
negative of the wage change for leavers (i.e. when the change
dummy variable is 1 for joiners, 0 for stayers, and -l for
leavers) because the "move premium" will have an equal effect on
leavers and joiners. However, when we estimate wage
differentials for joiners and leavers separately the coefficients
will probably be somewhat biased toward zero due to the sample
selection rule of not following workers who move to a new location
9. These tabulations are from the May 1984 CPS, which identifies
public administration and non-public administration government
workers for each level of government by the class of worker
variable. In addition, wage regressions with the same data set
find that wages of public and non-public administration workers
are not statistically or economically different.
10. Results were qualitatively the same when the sample was
restricted to workers whose annual log wage growth was between
-.75 and .75.
11. Postal workers, however, are identified from their three
digit industry.
12. Addition of a dummy variable measuring whether private
sector workers changed three digit industries to control for the
possibility that private sector workers may have changed jobs did
not qualitatively alter the results.
13. It should be noted that these results do not appear to be
due to the pooling of men and women in the sample. Table 1 shows
that both men and women experience substantial wage gains when35
they join the federal government, and both experience wage gains
when they leave the government, although the latter finding
occurs to a greater extent for women.
14.See Freeman (1984) and Solon (1986) for a formal treatment
of selectivity bias in longitudinal analyses.
15. One possible source of nonrandomness in the sample is the
selectivity of private sector firms that displace workers (e.g.
because their wages are exceed the competitive level). However,
this selection bias affects all workers in the data set.
16. Perloff and Wachter examine accounts of excessive
application rates in their analysis of pay comparability between
the postal service and private sector.
17.it should be noted that analyses of the quit rate may also
be biased by omitted worker quality controls.
18. An applicant remains on the register for one year. At the
end of the year if the applicant is not selected for a job but
wishes to remain eligible for selection in the following year, he
or she must formally notify OPM. In addition, an applicant may
apply for multiple jobs. See Krueger (1987) for a further
description of the application process and an analysis of the
determinants of applications for government jobs.
19. These averages are weighted by sample weights to reflect the
general population of employers.I thank Harry Holzer for
generously carrying out these tabulations.
20.The notion that a firm's compensation policy influences
organizational performance has long been stressed in the
personnel and economics literature. See Katz (1986) and36
Ehrenberg and Millcovich (1987) for a survey.
21.One exception is tcItniowski (1980), who performs before-
after union comparison of firefighterst wages in different
municipalities and concludes that the longitudinal and cross-
sectional analyses both show a small union wage differential.37
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